Hermeneutical Values in the Writings of Wilhelm Dilthey by Traina, Robert A.
He rmeneutical Values in
the Writings of Wilhelm Dilthey
1833 - 1911
Robert A. Traina*
Wilhelm Dilthey, the German philosopher of history, has had a
significant impact upon contemporary bibUcal hermeneutic. At times this
impact has not been salutary. One reason for this phenomenon is that the
use of Dilthey has depended on the point of view of the user. His works
suggest various possibilities to various interpreters. In addition, it needs to
be recognized that Dilthey himself was not a biblical expositor, and that
his position hardly accorded with an evangelical interpretation of Scrip
ture. In fact, he probably had pantheistic leanings which obviously would
not lend themselves to a sound bibUcal hermeneutic.^
Nevertheless, if one utiHzes Dilthey 's thought with care, it may
be possible to find in his writings valuable hermeneutical insights which
can be adapted to the articulation of a biblically-oriented theism. It will
be the purpose of this article to state some of these insights without im
plying approval of his entire philosophy of history and without engaging
in an exhaustive analysis of his thought.
The assumption underlying our findings is that the Scriptures con
sist of kerygmatic-historical documents, and that therefore a hermeneutic
of history is most appropriate to their interpretation.
One of the significant insights of Dilthey involves his distinction
between the material and methodology of the natural and the historical
sciences. In fact, it was probably this distinction which provided his
starting point. He held that whereas the natural sciences are concerned
with the non-human world, the essence of the historical sciences is the
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1. Cf. William Kluback's statement that "the concept of pantheism was central to
Dilthey's thought . . . the basic idea of a pantheistic force in the world was a
key to Dilthey's thinking," in Wilhelm Dilthey's Philosophy ofHistory (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1955).
2. Ibid., p. 52.
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psycho-physical world of dem Geist, expressed and manifested in certain
concretions and objectifications. He consequently held that the nomothetic
approach is germane to the natural sciences, for they are concerned with
working out general algebraic laws of phenomenal behavior based upon
abstracting natural phenomena from their context and substituting sym
bols which can be manipulated and which can be used to explain recurring
causal patterns. In contrast, the idiographic method corresponds to the
subject matter of the historical enterprise, and its goal is to find and to
understand den Geist behind its expressions.
Two inferences may be drawn from these distinctions: First, histor
ical documents demand a hermeneutic, whereas no hermeneutic is possible
in the investigation of the non-human world; second, a scientific approach
which supposedly Umits historical possibilities to what compHes with the
so-called "laws of nature" does not accord methodologically with the
character of historical materials. For whereas science deals with the usual,
history deals with the unique. Consequently, the canons of science are not
properly applicable to bibUcal history, especially to miraculous history, by
way either of interpreting its significance or determining its occurrence.
Dilthey further illuminates an historical hermeneutic by suggesting
its twofold character as involving both outer history and inner history.
Inner history consists of a dynamic reality which finds various modes of
external self-expression. Historical understanding has as its goal a herme
neutic of such inner history. However, the understanding of the inner
history of Geist can be achieved only through an understanding of its ex
pressions, for in the last analysis understanding is the reversal of the causal
process. When a hermeneutic based on the dual character of history is
applied, it follows that one must move through the Hterature to the life
and spirit of the writers and characters who produced it. The purpose of
such a process is to understand (verstehen) the inner life which gave ex
pression to the literary externalization. Thus biblical hermeneutic would
need to be concerned with understanding Hfe through the expressions which
it causes and by which its knowledge is mediated."^
In fact, it is Dilthey's contention that linguistic and literary docu
ments are the most reliable vital expressions for interpreting den Geist. This
view is based on two major factors. First, such expressions represent rela
tively fixed and stable phenomena to which one can return time and time
again, in contrast to momentary and fleeting expressions which are not
3, Wilhelm Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, 6 Vols. (Stuttgart: B.G. Teubner-
Verlagsgesellschafte, 1959-60), Vol. V, p. 332; cf. also p. 318 and Vol. VI, p. 309.
Also cf. Herbert Arthur Hodges, The Philosophy of Wilhelm Dilthey (London:
Routledge and Paul, 1952), pp. 128, 263.
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subject to careful and repeated reflection. It is for this reason that Dilthey
defines exposition as "flie skilled understanding of permanently fixed
manifestations of Ufe."'* Second, mental life finds in language alone
complete, exhaustive, and objective expressions, with the result that
hermeneutic finds its perfect form in the development of rules for inter
preting documentary expressions of the past.
Dilthey thus holds that hermeneutic is interpersonal: The inter-
preter-1 moves through literary expressions to the writer-Thou. Such an
interpersonal hermeneutic involves the interpreter's empathetic re-enact
ment of the writer's Ufe which produced the document. Thus to interpret
is to relive or to re-experience the life of the writer. To understand the
Gospels, for example, is to relive the experience of the disciples, to follow
in their original encounter with the historical Christ.
Such re-enactment seems to be the essence of the feasts of the
Hebrew calendar and the sacraments of the New Testament. To commemo
rate the Feast of the Passover one needed to re-experience the Exodus-
event; and to eat the broken bread and to drink the wine was to relive the
death oi Christ and to take up one's cross and follow Him. Properly to
engage in these memorials was to re-perform the life and events which
they embodied.
Such interpersonal re-enactment, which bridges the historical time-
gap, is possible, claims Dilthey, because of the fundamental similarity
between the present 1 and the past Thou. The interpreter is able to dis
cover the 1 in the Thou and the Thou in the 1, because every I and Thou
have universally shared life and meaning which provide the basis for the
possibility of an immanental pre-understanding. Such pre-understanding is
foundational to the indispensable ability to interrogate the text. Just
as in conversations the listener needs to be able to ask questions of the
speaker when the speaker's meaning is not clear, so the reader must be
able to interrogate the writer or any vital expression in order to under
stand it. And this abiUty to ask questions presupposes at least a possible
point of contact between the interpreter-1 and the interpreted-Thou.
To put it another way, it is because man is an historical being that
he is innately equipped to interpret historical documents. This histori
city of the interpreter exists in three senses. First, the interpreter, like the
object of interpretation, is a living, breathing human being who has the
possibiHty of realizing what he finds in history and is therefore able to
understand history. To interpret history is to interpret one's own realities
4. /Z7zy., V, pp. 217-300.
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and potentialities. Second, since man is a product of the same historical
forces which produced the past, these forces still live in him. Therefore,
the interpreter is really interpreting his own past. Finally, every person is
a congenital interpreter of history because he exercises the faculty of
memory, which involves remembering and interpreting one's own past. The
possibility of writing and understanding biography is inherent in the pos
sibility of writing autobiography.
Thus it is because the interpreter of history is at least potentially
the same as the maker of history that he is capable of reliving the past,
which is the essence of a hermeneutic of history. For example, the biblical
experience of peace is understandable because the reader knows anxiety
and he at least has the possibility of peace. Healing is interpretable because
we experience brokenness and have the potentiality of being made whole.
On the other hand, the person who has experienced an evil father has dif
ficulty interpreting the Fatherhood of God. We are able to understand life
out of ourselves only when we have lived it.
But if understanding is the discovery of the I in the Thou, then it
would follow, says Dilthey, that the presupposition to all hermeneutic is
self-hermeneutic. The better we understand ourselves, the better we
understand historical persons through their vital expressions. It is that
person who has insight into his own life who is able to interpret life out of
himself. And in turn, the better we understand past-Thous through their
documents, the better we understand ourselves.
There are those who would argue that such an hermeneutic is
"subjective" and therefore invaUd, for a sound hermeneutic is "objective."
To this Dilthey would reply that of course it is true that a good hermeneutic
is not merely subjective, but he would hasten to add that a purely objective
hermeneutic is impossible. Dilthey would call into question the dualistic
subjective-objective schema. Proper interpretation, he would say, is trans-
jective. To be sure, it does involve past-Thous whose personal beings and
expressions stand over against the interpreter. There are real objects which
are being interpreted, so that the interpreter is not holding a hermeneutic
monologue. A hermeneutic of history is notmerely a self-hermeneutic. At
the same time, no interpretation is possible without an "I" who is doing
the interpreting, and the "I" cannot interpret except in terms of his own
5. Jose Ortega y Gasset, Concord and Liberty, translated by Helene Weyl (New
York: W.W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1946), pp. 166-167.
6. Cf. Dilthey, op. cit., VI, pp. 201-202, 236.
7. Cf. Kluback, op. cit., p. 14.
8. Cf. Hodges, op. cit., p. 119.
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lived experience. Neither the object nor the subject can be eliminated from
the hermeneutic process. Therefore both the character of the object and
the character of the subject- will influence the interpretive process.^
It is this transjective character of hermeneutic which accounts for
two phenomena in biblical interpretation, namely, the fact that single
passages are given different interpretations by different interpreters in the
same historical period and by interpreters in different historical periods,
and the fact that the failure to live the Bible affects one's ability to under
stand it. In both instances what is indicated is that the history of the
subject necessarily colors the interpretation of historical objects. Inci
dentally, the same principle applies to historical value-judgments.^^
The historicity and temporaUty of both historical object and subject
leads Dilthey to hold to a dialectical view of a hermeneutic of history.
On the one hand there can be no understanding of history unless there is
a commonality between interpreter and interpreted. Unless there are
transferrable or recurring elements as between the Thou and the I, no
reliving and therefore no understanding is possible. On the other hand,
the fact that each individual is influenced by the convergence of a number
of temporal-historical factors which are in some sense unique and unre
peatable means that some factors are not transferrable or recurring. There
is no transcendental self which is unaffected by the historical process. Man
is one and yet not one; he is the same and yet not the same. To deny
sameness is to deny the possibility of contact between past and present
and therefore to deny a hermeneutic of history and the possibility of the
relevance of such a hermeneutic; and to deny differentiation is to deny
the mutability and influence of the temporal-historical process and there
fore to deny history. ^
Thus, for example, the historical Jesus is both unique and not unique.
In some ways the life of Jesus is beyond hermeneutic because it is un
repeatable and cannot be re-experienced. On the other hand, there cannot
be discipleship unless there are elements in the history of Jesus which
recur and are repeatable. Jesus can be followed because in some sense His
history is re-livable; but we cannot be twentieth-century "Christs,"
because Christ was historical and is in a real sense beyond re-living.
We have stated some of the hermeneutical insights which may be
gained from Dilthey. A number of others could be discussed, such as
9, Cf. Hajo Holbom, "Wilhelm Dilthey and the Critique of Historical Reason,"
in Journal of theHistory of Ideas, XI, 1 (Jani 1950), 109.
10. Cf. Dilthey, op. cit., VI, p. 297.
11. Ortega, loc. cit.
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his fascinating concept of "divination," but space does not permit. It is
hoped that the writings of Dilthey will eventually be translated into
EngUsh, thus making possible greater acquaintance with his views and
further use of his insights in developing a biblical hermeneutic.
12. In addition to the books mentioned and the writings of Dilthey himself, the
following books wDl be found helpful for further acquaintance with Dilthey;
William Kluback and Martin Wcinbaum, Dilthey's Philosophy of h.xisTcucc
(New York: Twaync, n.d.); and Wilhelm Dilthey, Pattern and Mcafiini; in
History, ed. by H. P. Rickman (Magnolia, Massachusetts: Peter Smith, n.d.).
